Re-Examining the Moving to Opportunity Study and its contribution to changing the distribution of poverty and ethnic concentration

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ABSTRACT

For the past decade and a half there has been a concerted effort to determine if policy interventions in residential location can solve the problems of inner city poverty and racial concentration. Studies based on data from the Gautreaux litigation and the HUD sponsored Moving to Opportunity (MTO) program have provided an overall optimistic interpretation of the possibilities of improving inner city lives with mobility vouchers and counseling. A re-analysis of the data from the MTO program focusing specifically on African American households suggests greater caution in the interpretation of the findings from either Gautreaux or the MTO program. There is no statistically significant difference between the percent of poor or the percent of black in the current neighborhoods between MTO and Section 8 experimental groups. In some cases there is no statistically significant difference between moves with vouchers and those who move without any assistance at all. Although there is some evidence that the MTO programs have brought specific gains for individual families, and there are quite significant geographic variability in outcomes, claims for the MTO program need to be treated with a great deal more caution than they have been to date.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

The half century long concern with inner city poverty and the inner city concentration of minority populations now focuses on help through individual assistance rather than the construction of either project based housing or scattered site housing, although there is still sizeable amounts of both in most metropolitan areas. The shift to individual assistance, usually through some form of housing voucher, reflects the increasing concern of government to refocus attention on individuals rather than on government intervention via housing demolition and construction. It reflects a fundamental change in social thinking and on how best to help poverty and under-privileged populations.

Within the context of concerns over the potential for a growing urban underclass and the associated concerns with growing poverty *concentrations* (although the percent in poverty actually declined in the 1990s), there has been increased interest in whether inner city minority households can escape poverty neighborhoods and whether government assistance can increase those probabilities. In the 1990s a tentative consensus emerged that enabling low income families to move from high to low poverty neighborhoods had the potential to reduce the levels of income segregation and as a corollary the degree of racial separation. The specific rationale for voucher based programs for poor inner households was to increase their access to neighborhoods which would enhance their employment and educational opportunities and diminish their exposure to crime, violence and drugs. Certainly some commentators suggested that these programs would both benefit individual families and have the potential to de-concentrate poverty. Although the program was not specifically designed to integrate minority populations the implication of moving to lower poverty

neighborhoods would have gains in living in more mixed neighborhoods as well.[1]

A specific voucher policy designed to reduce economic residential segregation might also have the effect of increasing opportunities for labor market success. Some research suggested that relocation to suburban area would increase job opportunities for low-income populations but other studies found high unemployment rates for suburban movers, as compared to city movers (Rosenbaum 1993). Still others have questioned the role of housing vouchers altogether. Grigsby and Bourassa (2004) argue that the housing choice voucher program is no longer effective as a mechanism for housing assistance. They note that there has been substantial improvement in housing quality, and that now only a very small proportion all the housing stock in the United States is severely inadequate. They conclude that the housing choice voucher program is little more than in income subsidy and should be merged into other aspects of the Federal social safety net.

These questions about the role of housing choice vouchers are at the heart of this paper. There have been other critiques of the MTO demonstration program but this paper takes up the issue of whether or not there are overall program gains from the special MTO program versus the regular section 8 voucher program, or even with no intervention at all. The focus of the paper is the evaluation of a program intervention in the mobility process and the outcomes in the poverty and levels of separation in the cities in the study. It also takes a specific spatial focus something which has been lacking in other studies of the MTO demonstration program. The paper does not argue against the view that some families may have benefited from access to vouchers and mobility counseling, but it does argue that as a policy the advantages have been emphasized at the expense of a more

[1] Certainly the tenor of much of the commentary in reports on the MTO program implicitly assume gains in integration and discusses the issue specifically in the reports.

balanced analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of voucher based interventions in the residential mobility process.

Specifically, the paper asks whether the distributions of African American households who move with one kind of assistance versus another (MTO vouchers with counseling, or Section 8 vouchers) are different in the kinds of poverty neighborhoods they enter and the levels of racial mixing they experience (a) initially and (b) in the longer term. The paper specifically examines whether the proportion of movers who live in lower poverty and more mixed areas is sustained over time. A central focus of the research is to contrast what is sometimes called the "intent to treat" sample (all persons in the study) with the "treated" sample (those who participated). The tests in the paper take up whether or not the distributions with vouchers and counseling (treated) are different from the baseline sample (intent to treat sample) who did not receive assistance. I use the sub-sample of African American households in this study as the group who are most often targeted with programs to alleviate poverty and to offer integrative opportunities as argued in several Federal court cases on housing availability. I use Kolmogorov Smirov tests of the difference of distributions to test for significant differences.

2.0 PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON RELOCATING POOR PEOPLE AND THE ROLE OF VOUCHERS

The growing emphasis on geographically dispersing housing subsidy recipients is based on the assumption that residence in concentrated poverty neighborhoods abets socially dysfunctional behavior, or more simply that poverty households will do better outside of poverty neighborhoods (Galster and Zobel, 1998). Although there are a number of individual studies of voucher use the main body of analysis has grown up around data sets which emerged as part of the Gautreaux litigation in Chicago, the Holman litigation in Minneapolis and from

the MTO program. The conclusions are by no means consistent and while some see positive effects from moving families from poor neighborhoods to less poor and sometimes suburban neighborhoods (Johnson et al, 2002; Goering, 2005; Briggs,2005) others question whether the programs can deliver substantial gains in dispersing poverty (Varady, 2005, Clark, 2005). In recent papers, Galster (2007) has provided an important distinction between a focus on whether the poor are advantaged or whether there is an aggregated societal gain. It is the latter which is the major concern of this analysis and that there is still considerable debate about "voucher intervention" in the residential fabric, including policy arguments in favor of enlarging the current MTO project, makes this analysis especially relevant.

As part of the Gautreaux housing litigation in Chicago a selection of inner city households living in Chicago Housing Authority public housing were provided opportunities to move to neighborhoods which were low percent black composition and to locations with low percent black composition. The Gautreaux research did not specifically disentangle poverty and race effects but still it did provide some evidence that those who moved to suburban communities were more likely to be in employment -though the salaries were not necessarily higher- (Rosenbaum and Popkin, 1991) compared to movers within the city, and that suburban youth did better on several educational measures (Rosenbaum, 1995). At the same time the Gautreaux findings have been criticized for selection bias (the 7,000 participants were a small proportion of all applicants to the program) and for a general focus on suburban movers with less attention to movers within the city. Movers in the Gautreaux program were given extensive mobility counseling and assistance but this is not the same as the MTO demonstration program as there was no comparable baseline group in the program. Overall, however, the evidence supports the view that participating tenants do gain from the dispersed moves although the gains may come not from the lower

concentration of poverty per se, but from the “structural advantages of the suburban areas, such as schools, public services, and job accessibility (Galster and Zobel, 1998, p.615).

A recent paper which uses data on 1506 cases, half the sample of 3000 Gautreaux participants who were in the program prior to 1990, to examine the outcomes for these participants is a recent example of the positive interpretation of the Gautreaux data (Keels et al, 2005). That paper reports that, "helping families relocate into communities that are racially/ethnically integrated… appears beneficial in both the short and the long run" (p. 71). The study makes a particular point of the stability of the movers and that they do not move back to their old neighborhoods. The data includes 1171 cases, 574 cases in the city and 597 cases in the suburbs. The study reports that 57 percent of suburban placements are still in the suburbs although nearly 30 percent moved back to the City. For City placements 78 percent are in the city still and 12 percent have moved to the suburbs.

The conclusion that the Gautreaux program was successful reiterates the basic motivation of this re-analysis of the MTO data. How do we decide about “program” successes as against “individual outcome” successes. There has been a tendency in the research literature on the Gautreaux program to emphasize the positive of the program as a whole when in fact it may better be argued as limited successes for particular participants. One aim of the Gautreaux program (at least as emerges in much of the literature) was to move households to the suburbs (in fact that was not a requirement of the program) – in this evaluation the program as a program was half successful. If, as one reviewer argues the outcome was related to how vouchers were distributed then this is an important caveat on evaluating the program contribution but that is beyond the scope of this review. With respect to levels of integration families are still living in concentrated black areas after moves, as the authors point out. However, they were slightly less black after

the move. The origin neighborhoods in the city were 9.8 percent white for city movers (movers who remained in the city) and15.0 percent white for suburban movers. Their current neighborhoods are now 24.1 percent white for city movers and 40.5 percent white for suburban movers (Table 1). Clearly, suburban movers are more likely to live in less black neighborhoods but still majority black neighborhoods. What the analysis does not address is that again city dynamics enters the picture. The initial gains of greater integration were cut in half by the end of the analysis period, from 84 percent white to 40 percent white. It is true that the current neighborhoods are a mix of white black and other minority (41 percent white, 38 percent black and 21 percent other). It is not that this signals failure for individuals but that the program outcomes are more subtle and less clear cut than the sometimes overly optimistic interpretations of those who seem to want to empower the various voucher programs.

The results of an attempt to redistribute low-income public housing residents in Minneapolis, also provides mixed findings on the ability to successfully relocate households with vouchers. As part of a consent decree in Minneapolis (Hollman v Cisneros, 1995) a large public housing complex in the inner city of Minneapolis was demolished and the residents provided with relocation assistance. Not all residents of the projects that were demolished were willing participants in the relocation project, Southeast Asian households were much more resistant to forced relocation than were African American households and most wanted to stay in Minneapolis (Goetz, 2003, p.203). Those who indicated a desire to leave the city wanted in the most part to move only to the inner ring of suburbs directly north of the city, i.e. close to where they lived before they moved. Preferences for familiar neighborhoods are especially strong in the project residents.

The largest study and a controlled investigation of the outcomes of mobility behavior is the Moving to Opportunity program, a program which was

based on the reported gains from the Gautreaux relocation program. In 1992 with a mandate from Congress, HUD initiated this experimental program as a method of testing whether or not providing vouchers and special counseling would improve the outcomes for households who moved from inner city neighborhoods.[2] The aim of the program was to find out "what happens when very poor families have the chance to move out of subsidized housing in the poorest neighborhoods of five very large American cities." (Orr et al 2003 p. i). The program divided potential voucher holders into three groups. The baseline group did not receive a voucher and could continue to live in public or assisted housing. The Section 8 group received a voucher and regular housing assistance counseling and could move wherever they could find a suitable unit. The experimental group received a voucher and special mobility counseling but participants were required to move to a low poverty neighborhood (less than 10 percent poverty according to the 1990 Census).

The most recent comprehensive report from the study, concludes that there are greater gains in living in lower poverty neighborhoods and in more integrated settings for the special program MTO movers than for regular section 8 voucher movers or those who did not get assistance (Orr, et al, 2003). This finding is supported in a global review by Johnson et al (2002), Goering (2005) and Briggs (2005). The study tested regular Section 8 movers and MTO special program movers against the baseline group and showed that both groups were significantly different from the baseline participants. The tests were run separately for those who were able to lease up and move and for the total sample (the intent to treat sample). The latter were marginally significant at the .05 level. In addition to tests about accessing lower poverty neighborhoods and integrated neighborhoods the study examined outcomes for education, health, employment, housing and

[2] The Moving To Opportunity (MTO) program was authorized in 1992 and began in 1994. The program is currently in the second evaluation stage.

changes in criminal/behavioral problems.[3]

There are questions about the findings of the Orr et al report (2003) and others (Varady, 2005; Kling et al 2004) have questioned the positive conclusions of the MTO findings. The tests in the Orr report may be insufficient, on at least two grounds to decide that the MTO special program achieved significantly better outcomes than the regular section 8 vouchers. There are two important tests that the Orr report does not conduct, a test of the difference between MTO and Section 8 vouchers and a test of city specific differences. The Orr study compares MTO special voucher and Section 8 each to the baseline sample and concludes that MTO has a larger impact therefore it is "better" than Section 8. We do not have a direct test of the difference. Equally problematic is that the data for all five cities were aggregated, so masking geographic impacts and averaging out differences across cities. We cannot know from the analysis whether MTO gains are city specific or general and if the positive gains in one city are weighting the aggregate outcomes positively.

While Goering (2005) suggests that a "well designed extension of MTO could offer opportunities to thousands of additional low income and public housing families" (p.145) , Varady (2005) is not convinced that voucher programs are the answer to concentrated poverty or racial segregation because at the very least of the strong desire of households to move nearby (many of the poor do not want to move away from friends and relatives) and of the many involuntary moves which are part of the mobility process. At the same time in a series of papers (Varady and Walker, 2000, 2003) he does suggest that moving to the suburbs (in one a case study of Oakland, California) leads to improvements in housing conditions. Given the range of opinions and different outcomes this paper re-examines the MTO outcomes on a city specific basis and examines the issue of

[3] In many instances across the areas tested there were only marginal gains, but they are not reviewed here. The focus is specifically on the outcomes for poverty and integration.

program rather than individual effects.

3.0 RE-EVALUATING VOUCHERS AS A TOOL FOR DISPERSING POVERTY AND INTEGRATING NEIGHBORHOODS

The data[4] for the MTO study were drawn from five cities, Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles and New York. The total sample was close to 4,600 families divided into 1,440 baseline cases (households who did not receive a voucher) 1,350 families who were offered vouchers and 1820 families who were given vouchers and special counseling. The data analyzed in this paper is for the subset of 2,298 African American families in the sample. There were 534 cases for Baltimore, 282 cases for Boston, 782 cases for Chicago, 302 cases for Los Angeles and 398 cases for New York (the sample sizes for each subset are given in the relevant tables. There is a small difference between the total of the cities analyzed in this study and the aggregate reported for all five cities. This small difference is generated by a very small number of cases where it was not possible to identify the tracts to which households moved.

The analysis used the 2000 Census poverty level and percent black as the context for analyzing locational changes of the sample.[5] The "lease up" dates, the terminology for participation in the project were in a window from 1994-1997. The current locations were evaluated as of 2002. The current tracts for the sample were used to evaluate the current outcome in percent poverty and racial composition. The original locations were concentrated in the central tracts of the city (naturally as this is where the public housing projects are located) and the

[4] The full data set is not publicly available, the data available for this study is limited to original locations , move tract, and current locations..

[5] It has been suggested that interpolated census tract percentages would alter the distributions but a test run for Los Angeles did not alter the test outcomes and in fact the changes for most tracts are proportional between census years.

mapping from these core areas gives a good indication of the "relocation"of the samples over time.[6] It is important to recall a major focus of this study, a test which has not been undertaken before – is there a difference in outcomes between MTO and Section 8 voucher holders?

3.1 An empirical analysis of vouchers as a tool for dispersing poverty

Experimental movers (MTO movers) in all five cities were more likely to be in lower poverty areas than Section 8 movers in their first lease-up (Table 2). This also shows up visually in panel (b) of the maps (Figures 1-3) for New York, Chicago and Los Angeles, especially the latter.[7] Of course this is to be expected, as the program required leasing in a low poverty neighborhood. While nearly all experimental movers chose neighborhoods which were less than 20 percent poverty neighborhoods (Census 2000 measures), only 22 percent of the regular Section 8 movers did so. The results are far less compelling when we test the results for the total sample of movers and non-movers (Table 3). Here we see that for some cities the distributions are different but for others there are no differences in the patterns.

I report the analysis in the following series of tests. For *movers* only, (1) I test original MTO moves with original Section 8 moves, (2) I test original MTO and current MTO locations (to see if there is regression- i.e. do the moves maintain their low poverty gains) and (3) I test current MTO versus current Section 8 moves. For the total sample (intent to treat), movers and non-movers (1) I test the current MTO locations against current Section 8 locations, (2) current MTO locations against the current baseline (control group), and (3) Section 8 current locations against the current baseline group. I use Kolmogorov-Smirnov

[6] The current 2002 locations are mapped but there may have been other previous move locations but these data are currently unavailable in public data sets. Original moves and current moves were separated by about 4-7 years on average.

[7] Boston and Baltimore have also been mapped but space precludes showing all cities.

(K/S) two sample tests at the .01 level and .05 levels (Table 4)[8] and I include as an appendix all the values for the tests (Table 4).

For all cities original MTO locations are significantly more likely to be in low poverty neighborhoods. For all cities the changes over time are also significant, they have not been able to maintain the low poverty locations. When we turn to differences between the current MTO and the current section 8 locations they are different for Baltimore, New York and Chicago but not for Los Angeles and Boston. That is, you cannot distinguish any gain for MTO over section 8 for those who actually moved for two of the five cities. That for three cities there are greater gains in being in a lower poverty neighborhood for experimental movers than for Section 8 movers is a finding which can be cited as evidence for the gains of the special MTO program in specific cities. The tests here suggest that aggregating the data as in the Orr studies hides important outcomes by specific geographies. Different cities have different outcomes.

When we turn to the major concern of the paper, measuring program effects that is, when movers and non-movers are aggregated and subjected to tests of difference, in no city is there a difference between current MTO and current Section 8 locations.[9] This is direct evidence that MTO as a program does not deliver gains over regular section 8 vouchers as a program. For three cities, Los Angeles, Boston and New York current MTO outcomes are better than the baseline outcomes, in Los Angeles and New York both MTO and Section 8 were better than the baseline, for the others there is no significant difference. For only one city (Los Angeles) is the current Section 8 pattern an unequivocal gain over the baseline sample. Two other cities show gains at the .05 level. This outcome

[8] A reviewer questioned the use of two sample K/S tests but it is the appropriate test – can we say that the samples come from a common distribution. And, with respect to the comment that direction is unspecified we know direction, ie whether MTO is more successful, by examining the distributions themselves. In fact the MTO program never makes the poverty outcomes significantly worse. A reviewer also suggested testing at the .05 and .01 levels and this has been included. Some small differences emerge for specific cities.

[9] Unlike the Orr (2003) results for all cities aggregated, the individual cities provide different outcomes.

reiterates the dynamism of the city and the fact that the many baseline households who were not given vouchers still managed to improve their housing situations. In other words the sample respondents without help have made gains in moving to low poverty neighborhoods. It is not always true but sufficiently prevalent to raise questions about the nature of the MTO intervention as a program. This is not totally unexpected as all households who participated in the sample, those who were selected to receive a voucher and those in the control group who did not, were all motivated to move. In Los Angeles the difference between the samples and the baseline sample is almost certainly a product of the city's demography and the high level Hispanic poverty population many of whom are undocumented and for whom moving is more difficult if not impossible.

The maps are a critical element of understanding any intervention in the urban fabric and provide a spatial representation of the outcomes (Figures 1-3). The overall similarity and the tendency to move to nearby neighborhoods reiterates basic mobility behavior in cities generally. The current Section 8 and current MTO and even the control patterns are remarkably similar visually for Chicago and New York. Even so the Section 8 patterns in Chicago are more dispersed than the MTO locations and the baseline/control patterns are not very different. Los Angeles is a significant contrast. The MTO patterns show significant gains, large numbers of movers accessed housing in the San Fernando Valley to the north of the central city, as did some of the baseline movers. The MTO mover patterns are much more circumscribed (Figure 3). Overall, the tables and figures emphasize that while there are initial gains those gains decline over time as individuals make additional locational choices. It will be a recurrent theme of this analysis that intervention in a dynamic system of residential choices and moves is inherently difficult and people do not 'stay put'; they move, often frequently, to bring their housing needs into adjustment with their housing space as has been established in consistent and substantial research on residential

mobility (Clark and Dieleman, 1996). Perhaps it is obvious now but the notion that "one-shot" intervention with a voucher and counseling would change spatial patterns was certainly overly optimistic. The fact that some authors continue to argue for such programs is not supported by this re-analysis.

There is considerable debate about whether or not non-movers should be added back in[10], but as a program evaluation of whether or not vouchers are successful, it cannot be based on only those who were successful in moving. If, as some suggest, MTO should be expanded, we must have some sense of the overall success of the program as a whole. Reasonable evaluations will differ on the specifics but to re-emphasize a re-current theme of this paper, I am attempting a program evaluation not whether or not specific households report gains from being in lower poverty neighborhoods. How to target such individuals is a critical dimension of overcoming poverty.

Finally, an analysis of the mobility rates across the five cities provides additional data on the problems of controlled choice programs (Table 5). While the (relatively uncontrolled) Section 8 recipients had relatively high mobility rates, across all cities, only in Los Angeles was there a rate of mobility which provides confidence in the ability of a controlled program to generate successful mobility. For the other cities mobility rates hovered around 50 percent with dramatically lower results in Chicago. Thus, the findings with respect to dispersing poverty are not sanguine, or at least with the interventions strategies envisaged in the MTO experimental program.

3.2 An empirical analysis of vouchers as a tool for racial integration

Although the MTO program was never designed as an integrative program several commentators (Briggs, 2005; Goering, 2005) have specifically discussed

[10] This suggestion was made by previous reviewers.

the “gains” in integration from the MTO program and the Orr report does provide data on levels of integration. It seems relevant to take up this programmatic issue as well as the discussion of poverty.

An earlier study of all voucher households in Baltimore (the sample was predominantly African American though not totally so) showed the difficulty in using vouchers to increase racial integration (Clark, 2005). A replication of that analysis for all five cities with African American households only, shows that the initial moves of the MTO experimental group do result in greater integration for the initial move (Table 6). In all of the cities at the .05 level and three of the cities at the more conservative level of .01 MTO movers are in more integrated settings than the Section 8 movers (Table 8). Interestingly there is less regression in racial integration than in poverty reduction. In Baltimore and Los Angeles (at the .05 level) there was regression to less integrated settings. In several cities, either at the .05 or .01 levels there were no differences between current MTO and Current section 8 patterns.

Again the main test, of program effects between MTO and section 8 effects, shows not difference at either the .01 or the .05 level. In fact the test values are extremely low. Nor are there important differences between total sample current MTO and baseline and current section 8 and baseline except for Los Angeles (Table 7). While there were some gains in poverty there are almost none, Los Angeles excepted, across the five sample cities in terms of increased living in mixed race settings. In Los Angeles the MTO movers make initial gains and to some extent maintain those gains. There is no statistical regression over time. The differences between the experimental MTO sample, the Section 8 sample and the baseline sample are almost certainly due to the nature of the composition of the ethnic population in Los Angeles where many tracts are in fact integrated but integrated with combinations of Hispanic and Black populations. Even without vouchers and the special counseling of the MTO program many

households in Los Angeles ended up in more integrated settings, certainly to tracts which are 40-60 percent black. The sample from Los Angeles and the particular dynamics of that city are certainly affecting the aggregated positive outcomes detected in the Orr report (Orr, et al 2003). This finding reiterates the affect of local demographics on program intervention.

It may be that to make gains in integration that specific targeting of integrated tracts will be necessary. Overall the findings of associated outcomes for integration are like those for poverty, less than compelling in the context of a policy. The fact that households in the control group are about as integrated as either the MTO sample or the Section 8 sample except in Los Angeles re-emphasizes the outcomes for self-selected households who expressed a desire to move and indeed had significant mobility rates.

4.0 CONCLUSION

How easy is it, as a policy, to intervene in poverty distributions and to integrate neighborhoods? At least some suggest that well designed voucher programs will work nationally (Goering, 2005, p.139). The research reported here suggests otherwise and raises important questions about such policy interventions. While it may be possible to disperse some individual households, whether we can use voucher programs as a policy intervention are far from clear, indeed the research here suggests that we proceed with caution in using such programs to change the concentrations and patterns of poverty. Others have suggested that it would take a lot of individual moves and a lot of money to effect any substantial de-concentration of the poor (Goetz, 2003).

The results from comparing aided and ordinary mobility reiterate the difficulty of intervening in the dynamic of household relocation. Consistent with our knowledge of mobility in general, subsequent moves by the MTO group were

often to neighborhoods like the ones they came from and in some cases back to their old neighborhoods. The geographic patterns illustrated in the maps emphasize the constraints on mobility and the selection process which favor known neighborhoods where there are friends, family and support relationships. Households vote with their feet, and decisions by governments are always embedded in the dynamic demography of the city (Tiebout, 1956). Income and assets are important and integral parts of the choice process as are preferences, and these forces play an ongoing role in the way in which households choose places to live. The evidence that the baseline sample made gains too and that their distributions are sometimes not different from the distributions of the combined samples of MTO movers and non-movers and the Section 8 movers and non-movers, suggests that we view with caution the calls for national voucher programs.

None of this of course denies the finding that MTO special programs did make initial changes in the distributions and these distributions for movers did have the effect of dispersing poverty. There were even gains over time in the dispersal but at the same time those gains when the MTO program is evaluated as a program, are statistically not significant. This is troubling to those who wish to emphasize the contributions of the MTO program but it forces us to refocus our attention on the division between gains for individuals and gains from programs. For individuals there were gains, as a program it cannot sustain the claims that have been made for it. Perhaps better counseling would have made a difference, counseling after the move might also be important. Indeed, there is evidence that on an individual basis vouchers can work, both MTO and section 8 vouchers were better than those without any assistance in some cases but to reiterate, this study is not about individual outcomes and localized situations but about overall policy outcomes of an intervention program. Tests of better post move counseling and other forms of assistance and their impact on the outcomes are tests which can

only be conducted in the future.

Behavioral changes are impacting the metropolitan structure. Exit and voice have long been opposites available for urban households in their locational decisions, especially the decision of whether to stay in the central city. Many are leaving. Reich (1991) calls it the secession of the successful (not of poverty households it is true but it certainly raises the issue of the mobility processes related to income and education), and Wolfe (1998) has pointed out that the propensity to secede is even higher among African Americans than other groups. These processes have been going on for some time and they are not likely to change in the near future. Such movements are the context within which governments and agencies intervene in the urban fabric and those interventions may not have the anticipated outcome. At the very least we must be cognizant of the strong forces built into choice and selection, processes which daily make and remake our urban fabric. These forces are often more powerful than our limited ability to intervene with specific programs of assistance. It may be reasonable to suggest that redirecting attention to the root problems of education, jobs and affirmative opportunities in the job market will provide greater gains in solving issues of inequality in the urban fabric.

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TABLE 1. Outcomes for Gautreaux movers by origin and current locations

	City Movers	Suburban Movers
	N=574	N=597
Origin location		
Percent black	83.7	81.8
Percent minority	90.2	85.0
Percent white	9.8	15.0
Placement location		
Percent black	47.2	6.5
Percent minority	67.6	15.6
Percent white	32.4	84.4
Current location		
Percent black	57.2	38.4
Percent minority	76.9	59.5
Percent white	24.1	40.5

Data from Keels, Ducan, DeLuca, et al 2005.

TABLE 2: PERCENT OF MTO AND SECTION 8 AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS BY THEIR ORIGINAL MOVE LOCATION AND IN THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS BY *POVERTY* COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Baltimore

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	35.29	4.46	19.64	9.17
10- 20	63.03	17.86	36.61	19.27
20- 30	.84	22.32	14.29	26.61
30- 40	.84	39.29	16.07	23.85
40- 50		14.29	8.04	13.76
50- 60		1.79	5.36	6.42
60- 70				.92
70- 80				
80- 90				
N	119	112	112	109

Boston

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	65.31	3.23	29.17	10.00
10- 20	30.61	48.39	37.50	33.33
20- 30	4.08	32.26	22.92	30.00
30- 40		16.13	8.33	23.33
40- 50			2.08	3.33
50- 60				
60- 70				
70- 80				
80- 90				
N	119	112	112	109

Chicago

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	32.31	1.79	21.60	4.55
10- 20	56.92	16.96	39.20	20.91
20- 30	8.46	21.43	18.40	25.45
30- 40	1.54	23.21	8.80	20.91
40- 50	.77	18.75	8.00	11.82
50- 60		10.71	4.00	8.18
60- 70		7.14		6.36
70- 80				.91
80- 90				.91
N	119	112	112	109

(Continued)

Los Angeles

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	13.54	1.89	4.40	0
10- 20	57.29	19.98	30.77	14.81
20- 30	25.00	26.42	26.37	24.07
30- 40		32.08	18.68	27.78
40- 50	4.17	22.64	16.48	27.78
50- 60			1.10	3.70
60- 70			2.20	1.85
70- 80				
80- 90				
N	119	112	112	109

New York

	Original move		Current location	
% Poverty	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 10	20.78	2.94	12.50	3.33
10- 20	68.83	19.12	42.19	18.33
20- 30	9.09	22.06	17.19	21.67
30- 40	1.30	22.06	10.94	25.00
40- 50		29.41	10.94	30.00
50- 60		4.41	4.69	1.67
60- 70			1.56	
70- 80				
80- 90				
N	119	112	112	109

TABLE 3: PERCENT OF TOTAL MTO, TOTAL SECTION 8, AND BASELINE AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS IN THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS BY *POVERTY* COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Baltimore

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	12.24	6.49	3.21
10- 20	25.00	21.43	17.31
20- 30	13.78	24.03	19.23
30- 40	17.86	20.13	16.03
40- 50	13.78	12.99	13.46
50- 60	15.82	14.29	26.92
60- 70	1.53	.65	3.85
70- 80			
80- 90			
90- 100			
N	196	154	156

Boston

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	15.74	4.62	2.08
10- 20	23.15	24.62	15.63
20- 30	23.15	20.00	16.67
30- 40	33.33	41.54	46.88
40- 50	4.63	6.15	14.58
50- 60		3.08	4.17
60- 70			
70- 80			
80- 90			
90- 100			
N	196	154	156

Chicago

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	8.38	4.62	4.35
10- 20	20.68	15.03	13.04
20- 30	16.49	21.39	19.02
30- 40	113.87	21.39	14.13
40- 50	8.90	12.72	11.96
50- 60	5.76	7.51	9.24
60- 70	17.54	11.56	19.57
70- 80	7.59	4.05	7.07
80- 90	0	.58	0
90- 100	.79	1.16	1.63
N	196	154	156

(Table 3 Cont.)

Los Angeles

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	3.48	0	0
10- 20	25.22	13.33	4.39
20- 30	21.74	21.67	8.77
30- 40	20.00	25.00	15.79
40- 50	.87	33.33	28.07
50- 60	6.09	3.33	.88
60- 70	2.61	3.33	23.68
70- 80			18.42
80- 90			
90- 100			
N	196	154	156

New York

%Poverty	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 10	6.92	2.56	0
10- 20	22.31	10.26	2.04
20- 30	12.31	12.82	6.12
30- 40	13.08	20.51	16.33
40- 50	31.54	33.33	39.80
50- 60	12.31	19.66	30.61
60- 70	1.54	.85	4.08
70- 80			0
80- 90			0
90- 100			1.02
N	196	154	156

Source: MTO data for combined files for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research

Note: Non-movers are households who were given vouchers and special counseling (MTO) and/or section 8 vouchers but were not able to convert those vouchers to actual moves.

Table 4: Kolomogorov Two Sample Tests on differences between programs, movers only (treated), and the total sample (intent to treat) for moves by poverty locations

	Movers			Total Sample		
City	Orig. MTO/ Orig Sect.8	Orig MTO/ Current MTO	Curr.MTO Curr.Sect.8	Curr. MTO Curr.Sect. 8	Curr.MTO Baseline	Curr. Sect. 8 Baseline
Baltimore	ab	ab	Ab			b
Boston	ab	ab			ab	
Chicago	ab	ab	Ab			
Los Angeles	ab	ab			ab	ab
New York	ab	ab	Ab		ab	b

a Significant at the .01 level on a two sample K/S test.
b Significant at the .05 level on a two sample K/S test.

TABLE 5: GEOGRAPHIC MOBILITY OF THE MTO AND SECTION 8 AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS (Percentages)

	Baltimore	Boston	Chicago	Los Angeles	New York
MTO Sample					
Moved	112	48	125	91	64
No- Move	84	60	257	24	66
Percent Move	**57.1**	**44.4**	**32.7**	**79.1**	**49.2**
Section 8 Sample					
Moved	109	30	110	54	60
No-Move	45	35	63	6	57
Percent Move	**70.8**	**75.0**	**63.6**	**90.0**	**51.3**

Source: MTO data for combined files for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research.

TABLE 6: PERCENT OF MTO AND SECTION 8 AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS BY THEIR ORIGINAL MOVE LOCATION AND IN THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS BY *RACIAL* COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Baltimore

	Original move		Current location	
% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	8.40	1.79	5.36	2.75
20- 40	26.89	13.39	12.50	16.51
40- 60	17.65	10.71	9.82	8.26
60- 80	14.29	14.29	16.96	10.09
80- 100	32.77	59.82	55.36	62.39
N	119	112	112	109

Boston

	Original move		Current location	
% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	67.35	12.90	47.92	13.33
20- 40	24.49	19.35	16.67	16.67
40- 60	0	19.35	2.08	20.00
60- 80	8.16	22.58	16.67	33.33
80- 100	0	25.81	16.67	16.67
N	119	112	112	109

Chicago

	Original move		Current location	
% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	6.92	0	3.20	0
20- 40	5.38	3.57	6.40	3.64
40- 60	12.31	1.79	8.80	2.73
60- 80	4.62	5.36	5.60	6.36
80- 100	70.77	89.29	76.00	87.27
N	119	112	112	109

Los Angeles

	Original move		Current location	
% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	69.79	43.40	46.15	40.74
20- 40	4.17	24.53	20.88	24.07
40- 60	12.50	22.64	27.47	18.52
60- 80	4.17	5.66	4.40	9.26
80- 100	9.38	3.77	1.10	7.41
N	119	112	112	109

(Table 6 Cont.)

New York

	Original move		Current location	
% Black	MTO mover	Section 8 mover	MTO mover	Section 8 mover
0- 20	6.49	5.88	6.25	8.33
20- 40	7.79	36.76	18.75	35.00
40- 60	11.69	29.41	21.88	31.67
60- 80	24.68	11.76	23.44	6.67
80- 100	49.35	16.18	29.69	18.33
N	119	112	112	109

Source: MTO data for combined files for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research.

TABLE 7:PERCENT OF TOTAL MTO, TOTAL SECTION 8, AND BASELINE AFRICAN AMERICAN RESPONDENTS BY THEIR CURRENT LOCATIONS BY RACIAL COMPOSITION OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Baltimore

%Black	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 20	4.59	2.60	2.56
20- 40	8.16	12.34	4.49
40- 60	9.69	5.84	7.05
60- 80	11.73	12.34	6.41
80- 100	65.82	66.88	79.49
N	196	154	156

Boston

%Black	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 20	27.78	16.92	22.92
20- 40	17.59	12.31	17.71
40- 60	12.04	16.92	14.58
60- 80	28.70	41.54	34.38
80- 100	13.89	12.31	10.42
N	108	65	96

Chicago

%Black	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 20	2.36	1.16	2.17
20- 40	3.14	2.89	3.80
40- 60	4.97	2.89	4.89
60- 80	3.14	4.62	4.35
80- 100	86.39	88.44	84.78
N	382	173	184

Los Angeles

%Black	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 20	41.74	38.33	14.91
20- 40	18.26	23.33	14.91
40- 60	31.30	23.33	47.37
60- 80	7.83	8.33	21.93
80- 100	.87	6.67	.88
N	115	60	114

(Table 7 Cont.)

New York

%Black	MTO movers and non-movers	Section 8 movers and non-movers	Baseline sample
0- 20	5.38	4.27	5.10
20- 40	28.46	31.62	35.71
40- 60	27.69	41.03	40.82
60- 80	21.54	10.26	16.33
80- 100	16.92	12.82	2.04
N	130	117	98

Source: MTO data for combined files for Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York prepared by HUD's Office of Policy Development and Research.

Table 8: Kolomogorov Two Sample Tests on differences between programs, movers only (treated), and the total sample (intent to treat) for moves by race of neighborhood locations

	Movers			Total Sample		
City	Orig. MTO/ Orig Sect.8	Orig MTO/ Current MTO	Curr.MTO Curr.Sect.8	Curr. MTO Curr.Sect. 8	Curr.MTO Baseline	Curr. Sect. 8 Baseline
Baltimore	ab	ab				
Boston	ab		B			
Chicago	b					
Los Angeles	b	b	B		Ab	ab
New York	ab		B		B	

a Significant at the .01 level on a two sample K/S test.

b Significant at the .05 level on a two sample K/S test.


75% Black
Initial concentration of sample


75% Black
Initial concentration of sample




75% Black
Initial concentration of sample

Figure Captions

1. Current locations of households that moved in New York (a- top panel) regular Section 8 moves, (b) MTO moves, (c) Control sample moves. Although the initial origins are distributed across several central tracts in the city, for visualization purposes, they are shown as initiating from one central location.

2. Current locations of households that moved in Chicago (a- top panel) regular Section 8 moves, (b) MTO moves, (c) Control sample moves. Although the initial origins are distributed across several central tracts in the city, for visualization purposes, they are shown as initiating from one central location.

3. Current locations of households that moved in Los Angeles (a- top panel) regular Section 8 moves, (b) MTO moves, (c) Control sample moves. Although the initial origins are distributed across several central tracts in the city, for visualization purposes, they are shown as initiating from one central location.

APPENDIX

Table A: Kolmogorov Smirnov tests of significance for all pairs of possibilities (poverty):

	Movers Only			Total Sample		
	Original MTO/Sec. 8	Original/Current MTO	Current MTO/Sec. 8	Current MTO/Sec. 8	Current MTO/Baseline	Current Sec.8/Baseline
Baltimore	0.7590 (0.2146)* (0.1790)±	0.4207 (0.2140) (0.1790)	0.2781 (0.2193) (0.1830)	0.0930 (0.1755) (0.1464)	0.1311 (0.1749) (0.1459)	0.1631 (0.1852) (0.1545)
	119,112	*119,112*	*112,109*	*196,154*	*196,156*	*154,156*
Los Angeles	0.5196 (0.2789) (0.2327)	0.4567 (0.2385) (0.1990)	0.2265 (0.2800) (0.2336)	0.1543 (0.2596) (0.2166)	0.3341 (0.2154) (0.1797)	0.3631 (0.2600) (0.2169)
	96,53	*96,91*	*91,54*	*115,60*	*115,114*	*60,114*
Boston	0.6208 (0.3741) (0.3121)	0.3614 (0.3310) (0.2762)	0.2334 (0.3794) (0.3165)	0.1281 (0.2559) (0.2135)	0.2766 (0.2286) (0.2135)	0.1485 (0.2618) (0.2185)
	49,31	*49,48*	*48,30*	*108,65*	*108,96*	*65,96*
New York	0.6755 (0.2731) (0.2263)	0.3492 (0.2757) (0.2300)	0.3302 (0.2929) (0.2444)	0.1641 (0.2077) (0.1733)	0.3338 (0.2181) (0.1819)	0.2166 (0.2232) (0.1862)
	77,68	*77,64*	*64,60*	*130,117*	*130,98*	*117,98*
Chicago	0.7048 (0.2101) (0.1753)	0.2743 (0.2042) (0.1704)	0.3535 (0.2131) (0.1778)	0.0941 (0.1494) (0.1246)	0.1167 (0.1463) (0.1220)	0.1264 (0.1726) (0.1440)
	130,112	*130,125*	*125,110*	*382,173*	*382,184*	*173,184*

* represents 0.10 level of significance
± represents 0.05 level of significance

Table B: Kolmogorov Smirnov tests of significance for all pairs of possibilities (race):

	Movers Only			Total Sample		
	Original MTO/Sec. 8	Original/Current MTO	Current MTO/Sec. 8	Current MTO/Sec. 8	Current MTO/Baseline	Current Sec.8/Baseline
Baltimore	0.2705 (0.2146)* (0.1790)±	0.2526 (0.2146) (0.1790)	0.0401 (0.2193) (0.8300)	0.0609 (0.1755) (0.1464)	0.1339 (0.1749) (0.1459)	0.1261 (0.1852) (0.1545)
	119,112	*119,112*	*112,109*	*196,154*	*196,156*	*154,156*
Los Angeles	0.2639 (0.2788) (0.2327)	0.2364 (0.2385) (0.1990)	0.1118 (0.2800) (0.2336)	0.0630 (0.2596) (0.2166)	0.3018 (0.2154) (0.1797)	0.3185 (0.2600) (0.2169)
	96,53	*96,91*	*91,54*	*115,60*	*115,114*	*60,114*
Boston	0.5958 (0.3741) (0.3121)	0.2726 (0.3310) (0.2762)	0.3458 (0.3794) (0.3165)	0.1614 (0.2559) (0.2135)	0.0474 (0.2286) (0.2185)	0.1140 (0.2618) (0.2185)
	49,31	*49,48*	*48,30*	*108,65*	*108,96*	*65,96*
New York	0.4609 (0.2731) (0.2263)	0.2091 (0.2757) (0.2300)	0.2812 (0.2929) (0.2444)	0.1538 (0.2077) (0.1733)	0.2009 (0.2181) (0.1819)	0.1078 (0.2232) (0.1862)
	77,68	*77,64*	*64,60*	*130,117*	*130,98*	*117,98*
Chicago	0.1926 (0.2101) (0.1753)	0.0622 (0.2042) (0.1704)	0.1204 (0.2131) (0.1778)	0.0353 (0.1494) (0.1246)	0.0161 (0.1463) (0.1220)	0.0366 (0.1726) (0.1440)
	130,112	*130,125*	*125,110*	*382,173*	*382,184*	*173,184*

* represents 0.10 level of significance
± represents 0.05 level of significance