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Human Mobility in a Globalizing World: Urban Development Trends and Policy Implications

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Chapter 13

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INTRODUCTION

The 21st Century will have to contend with two demographic issues – a growing older population and an increasingly mobile population. On the one hand there will be aging populations in Europe, Japan and North America, and on the other young mobile populations in and from China, India and Africa. The old notions that have been used to explain immigrant flows – economic opportunities, structural imbalances and state economic and geopolitical policies, while still relevant, will need to be supplemented by paradigms which include a focus on refugee, amnesty and undocumented flows. The immigrant flows of the past three decades have already created large immigrant stocks in Europe and North America and with policies which privilege family migration it is likely that immigration flows will increase simply as a function of existing immigrant population stocks. The flows may also generate unemployment and un-assimilated populations in the new host countries. It is almost certain that Europe and North America will be faced with dual populations (and their associated political outcomes) – an aging native born citizenry and youthful immigrants. These changes at the global level will be played out in community and neighbourhood changes.

This chapter examines the nature, size and outcomes of international migration flows and their implications for local community changes. It examines the way in which these flows have changed over recent decades, connects these changes to globalization and examines how local labour markets are being transformed by these global flows. I review the current thinking about reasons for international migration, document the size of the flows and their composition, including the rise in undocumented migration, and draw

on some data from Southern California to provide details on how these changes are being played out in local contexts. The chapter concludes by revisiting the discussion of whether or not the large scale international flows from new ethnic origins will bring about a clash of cultures, whether we will pull together or pull apart, in the coming decades.

While some have argued that the change in international migration is unprecedented in its scale and scope, others see it as a continuation of a process that began a century ago when rapid population growth, urbanization, and the transformation to a modern industrialized society was initiated with declining death rates and rising fertility rates. Those who argue in favour of viewing the rise in international migration as part of an ongoing process play down the view of international migration as a crisis and suggest that it is better seen as embedded in the changes that flow naturally from an increasingly interconnected world.

THEORIES OF POPULATION MOVEMENT

Generally the research literature has divided the factors that encourage migration into push and pull factors – opportunities and immigrant stocks in the destination country are pull factors and negative factors in the origin countries push migrants to leave. In this conceptualization economic migrants are encouraged to move by the jobs across the border and pushed by the unavailability of any work in the source country. Increasingly, family networks increase the likelihood of flows by providing contacts and reducing the risks of migration. Borjas (1989) has suggested that the factors are not equally weighted in terms of their impact on migration and they change over time. Supply push factors may be strongest at the initiation of migration streams but later in the process the pull of families may play a stronger role.

Young people move for jobs. Most international migrants move from lower to higher wage labour markets and this explains why most of the movement has been to high income countries. However as the stock of international migrants has increased in developing nations there are growing movements of people, for family reunification, as well as for employment. Immigrants entering the United States in 2005 will more likely be motivated by family reunification as the primary reason than simply employment based reasons. In the United States in 2004, nearly 70 per cent of immigrants were admitted as part of the family reunification program and only 13 percent were admitted as part of the employment visa program (INS, Abstract, 2005). This is not to say that the immigrants who arrive as family members do not take jobs and enter the labour force. The issue is that many family migrant households include children who need education, health care and other support services. This burden is often borne locally while the benefits are broadly speaking to the national economy.

Martin (2005) distinguishes between economic motivations and non-economic motivations and places family reunification within the non-economic factors. Yes, there is a debate over how to address the varying roles of economic and non-economic factors in international migration. A debate, which is largely between those who emphasize the neoclassical economic approach to international migration (Borjas, 1989) and those who emphasize the changing world order as the central stimulus for increasing flows from developing to developed countries (Massey, et al., 1993). Neoclassical theories of migration privilege jobs and opportunities as the driving force in relocation. This literature, stimulated by Sjaastad (1962) and extended and developed by a wide variety of authors (Borjas, 1989, Hatton and Williamson, 2003) seeks to explain migration as the disequilibrium between earnings in an individual's home country, and the possible earnings in a migrant destination modified by the costs of immigration. In this conceptualization individuals (and households) are more likely to migrate the greater the disparity between the wages in the origin and the destination (Hatton and Williamson 2002). The theory also notes that the likelihood of migration will decline with the age of the individual, as the remaining working life becomes shorter. Thus, for any given incentive, migration will be greater the larger the proportion of the origin population that is in the younger working ages. Human capital is a central part of the neoclassical theory – migration will increase with skill level, if the return to skills is greater in the destination than the origin. Thus we would expect that information based societies with a demand for skilled and educated workers will generate a selectivity in migration from source regions.

In contrast to the neoclassical explanation for high levels of international migration, those who invoke an explanation for migration based on a changing world order, suggest that the flows must be seen in the context of inequality, asylee and refugee migration (Massey, et al. 1993; 2005). In this context, very large proportions of the flows are detached from economic pulls and pushes, and reflect survival strategies by workers increasingly disconnected from their labour markets. Migration becomes a survival and investment process by families who send money back to origins as a long-term survival strategy. The emphasis on context dependent flows, described sometimes as the new economics of a changing world order emphasizes the contrast between increasingly flexible labour markets, but rigid national boundaries and controls on migration. Several recent papers, which stress the inability of the neoclassical model to explain international flows suggest that in fact, non-economic factors are now more important in migration decisions than economic factors (Hugo, 2005).

There is no doubt that the stock of previous migrants from a source country, living in the destination, the so-called “friends and relatives affect”, is a critical factor in the continuing flows between origins and destinations. However, it can be viewed either in neoclassical or a changing world order per-

spective. Hatton and Williamson (2003) emphasize that even the friends and relatives effect can be interpreted within an economic framework. In this view, a large number of previous flows increases destination specific utility, and so reduces the loss of ethnic capital. Large immigrant stocks reduce the migration costs for following flows.

Clearly the neoclassical economic approach does not account for the constraints of policy and assumes relatively free movement across borders, something that is no longer true. Still, overall the body of research that has been published in the last decade finds that migration is negatively related to source country income per capita and to source country inequality (Yang, 1995) and it is positively related to measures of the migrant stock at the destinations. Clearly, stocks matter whether we interpret their impacts as social or economic. But migration was also positively related to measures of political rights and individual freedoms in source countries and negatively related to political instability and in at least one study that was the single most important determinant of all immigration to the US in the period 1982-86 (Kamemera et al., 2000). Distance, relative income and US unemployment all mattered. Similar work by Clark et al (2002) showed that net effect of lower levels of income and education in South America compared to Western Europe was to raise the typical South American countries migration rate by 25 per cent over that of Western Europe. Relative inequality also raises the migration rate from the typical South American country by 46 per cent over that of the typical Western European country. A youthful population in the source country also has a positive affect, but its impact is more modest, it raises the migration rates by about 11 per cent. Again, greater distance reduces the migration rate, being landlocked reduces it, while being predominantly English-speaking raises it, as does the stock of previous immigrants from a particular country (Clark, et al.,2003).

Whether families come with work visas or as participants in family reunification, in the end most of the world's migrants are in the workforce. Overall the estimates are that about half of world's 175-190 million immigrants are in the labour force (United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey, 2004). There is no international database that provides information on immigrant workers by skill, but the general perception is that migrants in most developed countries are at the extremes of the skill levels and either provide basic lower-level services or high level contributions to the information economy.¹ Martin (2005) has suggested that migrant skill levels tend to have an hour-

¹ Later in the chapter I examine some occupational data for the United States and the United Kingdom. Certainly the US data tends to an hour glass shape but the UK data shows that legal immigrants are more likely to be in professional and managerial positions. Clearly, the occupational distribution depends on national immigration policies with respect to entry.

glass shape – the top with tertiary education and the bottom with an elementary school or less.

Whether travelling with visas or not, crossing international borders to settle or work is both difficult and stressful, and increasingly so, as developed nations have stressed border control but it has come just at a time when globalization has generated a greater awareness of the opportunities and possibilities.

LINKS TO GLOBALIZATION

We are familiar with the way in which business and technological interaction has increased in the past two decades. We use, even over use, the term globalization to capture the complex nature of the increasing integration of economies and societies around the world. Certainly, capital moves globally and nation states are now caught up in a changing world as jobs move “off shore”, manufacturing production is replaced by services, and the knowledge industry changes the nature and pace of the inter-connections between countries. Inexpensive telephone connections, cheap international travel and email exchanges have linked the world in a way which is quite different from the period before the growth of computers and information technology more broadly. Multinational corporations manufacture products in many countries and sell to consumers around the world. Simple statistics capture the nature and increasing reach and range of globalization. Trade between countries as a percent of gross world product has increased from about 15 percent in 1986 to nearly 27 percent in 2006. Communication has changed – 30 percent of the world’s population are cell phone users and it is estimated that internet users will soon reach a billion.

Money, technology and raw materials move with ease across national borders. It is perhaps not surprising then to find that there has been a concomitant increase in the movements of people across national borders. Even though many argue that globalization will have important positive effects on poverty reduction there are still large numbers who are living on the margins of the emerging global economy (Friedman, and Randeria, 2004). It is many of those people who form the increasing flows of undocumented populations who move for economic advantage, to escape poverty or simply to follow flows of family migrants to new and richer opportunities.

Globalization has created new wealth probably and arguably lifted a large number of people in developing countries out of poverty. Still, the gap between rich and poor has not narrowed significantly and in some cases, economic disparities are growing, rather than declining. Developing countries are struggling with high levels of demographic growth are not producing enough jobs to deal with their expanding populations of young people. In this context is not surprising that people are looking beyond their national borders to opportunities in the developed countries. We can expect more immigration

flows not less and probably more undocumented immigration in the coming decades. Whether, globalization will transform the inequalities between the developed and developing world is still an open question although the evidence from market economies is that it will over the longer perspective.

QUESTIONING GLOBALIZATION AND RE-IMAGINING INTERNATIONAL FLOWS


Globalization is sometimes seen as a new era, a post millennium era in which we will enter a new world, global, postmodern post-national and hybrid (Friedman, 2004). Those who take this position, argue that we have entered a world which once was local, but is now global, a world which has changed from the less to the more inclusive. Because outsourcing has created “high tech” centres in India and around the world Friedman comes to the conclusion that the world is flat – that the playing field is even. At least one commentator has suggested that the world may be flat only if you are 35,000 feet in business class, otherwise it is very, very lumpy. Moreover, there is considerable evidence, which suggests that our world has been in the process of change for at least a century. Hirst and Thompson (1996) focus attention on the role of submarine cables from the middle of the 19th-century and the increase in foreign direct investment, which began well before World War I. In fact there is a strong argument to be made that the rapid population growth, migration, and overseas investment and world development, prior to World War I was as much a process of globalization, as it is today. What is different, of course, is the shift from a world based largely on industrial processes to an economy that privileges information, and a world in which industrial production exists within a world of information technology. One might argue that we have entered a second stage in the globalization process. It still has considerable similarity with the earlier industrial globalization – high immigration rates, increased foreign capital flows, but now flows from politically unstable nations, and increased undocumented migration and growing repatriation of earnings to families left behind.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND THE NATURE AND SIZE OF GLOBAL FLOWS

During the 20th Century the world population increased from 1.6 billion people to 6.1 billion people and now it has increased further to 6.5 billion (United Nations Population Division, 2005). Much of the growth has been in the past half century (Figure 1a). At no time in the past has the world population grown so quickly or to such a size. Although the rate of growth has slowed, the world population will still reach about 9.1 billion people by the middle of this century. Of course, the actual number will depend on the extent to which family planning spreads more widely and on our ability to control the HIV/AIDS epidemic. The annual increment to the world population

continues to be more than 77 million persons a year. India, China, Pakistan Bangladesh, Nigeria and the United States account for half of that growth. While there is less concern about providing food per se for this growing population, there are real questions about access to safe drinking water, health care and human population security. Population growth alone will continue to stress the world's ability to provide a clean and safe environment. At least a part of the difficulty of providing a safe environment is related to the rapid expansion of the world's urban population.

Figure 1: Growth of world population and the stock of international migrants (persons living outside their country of birth).




Data Sources: United Nations, Population Division 2005 and United Nations 2004, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Economic and Social Survey 2004, International Migration.

The world population living in urban regions and cities reached approximately 3.2 billion persons in 2005 and is expected to rise to more than 5 billion persons in the next 25 years. The world's population is at an historic turning point. Within a few years, half the world's population will be urban (www.peopleplanet.net – The World Comes to Town). The change in the last half-century, has been significant; in 1950, the world was about 30 per cent urban- 52.5 per cent in the more developed regions and a little less than 18 per cent in less developed regions. Now in 2005, about 75 per cent of the population in developed regions is in urban areas and a little more than 43 per cent in developing regions. Along with a growing world population, there will be continuing increases in urban populations especially in developing regions.

Cities and urban areas are increasing in numbers and size (Figure 2). They are gaining an estimated 60 million people per year. In many developing

countries, cities are growing two to three times faster than the overall population growth. Some cities, have astonishing growth rates – Dhaka doubled in population between 1990 and 2000. Other cities in India have also had very strong growth rates. Even though as we begin the 21st century cities continue to be engines for economic growth in a global economy, they often face a crisis in their inability to deal with the massive influx of people. In many of these cities poverty is endemic and discontent and civil unrest could become a serious problem if the growth is not paralleled with a concomitant growth of the urban infrastructure and it is to cities that much of the international flows of migrants persists.

Figure 2: The growth of the World's population



Data Source: United Nations, Population Division, 2005

FLOWS, NUMBERS AND CORRELATES

Along with population growth the number of people who live outside their country of birth has increased dramatically (Figure 1b). Now about 175-190 million people live outside their country of birth. While at one level the 175-190 million people who live outside of that country of birth is certainly large, many of the world's 6.3 billion people will move only short distances if they move at all. Many of the people who do move and who live outside their country of birth are legal migrants, but many others are undocumented workers, asylum-seekers and refugees. There are major migration streams from Central America and from Asia to North America, and other important streams from North Africa and Eastern Europe and Russia to northern Europe and flows from the Philippines, Indonesia and India to the Middle East. But it is important to note that there are also large scale flows between countries in South America, Africa and within Southeast-Asia. The streams are not constant and change over time, with changes in economic factors and in the political contexts of sending and receiving areas.

In addition to the very large number of people who live outside their country of birth, there is a substantial number of migrants who move within their own countries. These internally displaced populations have now reached about 27 million people, and the number is growing (Clark, 2006a). Internally displaced populations are those that have been forced to flee their homes, because their lives were in danger from political conflict or environmental degradation. Unlike refugees, they have not crossed an international border.


Overall, there are more migrants in developed nations than in developing nations (Table 1). The increase was from about 35 million to 110 million in developed nations in the forty years between 1960 and 2000 (Table 1). Between 1980 and 2000, while the increase in less developed nations was only from 52 million to 65 million, the foreign stock in developed countries doubled. Most OECD nations have between five and 15 percent migrant populations. However there are some countries with considerably higher percentages including Australia, with 25 per cent, New Zealand with 23 per cent, and Canada with 19 per cent. International migrants by region of destination varies from the 6 million in Latin America and the Caribbean, and a similar amount in Oceania to the 41 million in North America and 33 million in Europe (Table 1). Indeed the United States dominates with more than 35 million foreign born residents. Germany, Russia, the Ukraine, France, India and Canada all have more than 5 million foreign born residents (Figure 3). In percentage terms the countries with the highest proportion of foreign born persons are the Gulf States nations of United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait. Jordan and Israel also have very high percentages of foreign born residents.

Table 1: International migrants by region of destination, 1960-2000 (millions)

| Region | 1960 | 1980 | 2000 |
|---------------------------|------|------|-------|
| World | 75.9 | 99.8 | 174.9 |
| Developed nations | 32.1 | 47.7 | 110.3 |
| Developing nations | 43.8 | 52.1 | 64.6 |
| | | | |
| Africa | 9.0 | 14.1 | 16.3 |
| Asia | 29.3 | 32.3 | 43.8 |
| Europe | 14.0 | 22.2 | 32.8 |
| USSR (former) | 2.9 | 3.3 | 29.5 |
| Latin America (Caribbean) | 6.0 | 6.1 | 5.9 |
| North America | 12.5 | 18.1 | 40.8 |
| Oceania | 2.1 | 3.8 | 5.8 |

Source: United Nations, Trends in Total Migrant Stock- the 2003 Revision.

Figure 3: Foreign born stock by major national destinations 2000



Source: United Nations Population Division (2002) International Migration Report

The old pattern of a century ago of flows from Europe to North America and to Australia and New Zealand has become a much more diverse set of origins and destinations, reflecting the increasingly global nature of migration. The flows to New Zealand and Australia are still large but they come now from Asia, Central Europe and myriad other destinations. A century ago they came from Europe when Europe had only a trickle of immigrants. Now there are nearly 19 million foreign born residents in Europe (Table 2). There has been increased diversity, both in the country from which international migrants come and in the destinations that they choose. Now migrants from many developing countries, particularly in Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean have become numerous in Western Europe and North America. It is still true that proximity is important and that people in general move within their broad regions where there are historical ties and cultural similarities. But it is clear that the richer OECD countries are receiving large and sustained flows of immigrants (Table 3)². It is also true that every year more and

Table 2: Traditional Countries of Immigration and Europe 1910 and 2000 (thousands)

| Country | 1910 | | | 2000 | | |
|---------------|---------|-----------|----------|---------|----------|----------|
| | Pop. | Mi-grants | Per cent | Pop. | Migrants | Per cent |
| Australia | 4,455 | 787 | 17.7 | 19,153 | 4,705 | 24.6 |
| Canada | 7,207 | 1,587 | 22.0 | 30,769 | 5,826 | 18.9 |
| New Zealand | 1,008 | 306 | 30.3 | 3,784 | 850 | 22.5 |
| United States | 91,972 | 13,516 | 14.7 | 283,003 | 34,988 | 12.3 |
| W. Europe* | 143,099 | 3,348 | 2.3 | 183,502 | 18,836 | 10.3 |

Note: * Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and Switzerland

Source: International Labour Office, World Statistics of Aliens: A comparative study of Census returns, 1910-1920 and United Nations Trends in Total Migrant Stock: The 2003 Revision.

² There is growing evidence that the flows may be stabilizing or even declining. See John Salt (2005) Current Trends in International Migration in Europe. Strasbourg, Council of Europe Publishing.

Table 3: Population Inflows into selected OECD Countries 2000 and 2001 (000s)

| Country | 2000 | 2001 |
|----------------|-------|--------|
| Europe | | |
| Austria | 66.0 | 74.8 |
| Belgium | 68.6 | 66.0 |
| Czech Republic | 4.2 | 11.3 |
| Denmark | 22.9 | 25.2 |
| Finland | 9.1 | 11.0 |
| France | 126.8 | 141.0 |
| Germany | 648.8 | 685.3 |
| Greece | - | - |
| Hungary | 20.2 | 19.5 |
| Italy | 271.5 | 232.8 |
| Ireland | 24.1 | 28.0 |
| Luxembourg | 10.8 | 11.1 |
| Netherlands | 91.4 | 94.5 |
| Norway | 27.8 | 25.4 |
| Portugal | 15.9 | 14.2 |
| Sweden | 42.6 | 44.1 |
| Switzerland | 85.6 | 99.5 |
| Australia | 92.3 | 88.9 |
| Canada | 227.3 | 250.3 |
| Japan | 345.8 | 351.2 |
| New Zealand | 38.8 | 62.1 |
| United Kingdom | 379.3 | 373.3 |
| United States | 849.8 | 1064.3 |

Source: OECD (2003) Trends in International Migration 2003 Paris: OECD (adapted from Table A1.1)

more migration occurs between developing countries, from Bangladesh to India, or from India, Egypt, and Yemen to the Persian Gulf States.

As long as high birth rates and poverty continue to place pressure on populations, migrants will see advantages to moving to countries with more resources and greater opportunities. Many developing countries experience inflows of people from other developing countries. This “south-south” migra-

tion, from Guatemala to Mexico for example, occurs for the same reasons people migrate to developed countries.

In 2006 the total population of Western and Central Europe the Balkans and Turkey was 594 million. The European Union alone (the EU 25) had 462 million people. Europe is not growing from naturally increase – the natural increase is only about .7 per 1000 inhabitants, almost all the growth in Europe is coming from immigration, and in some cases as in Spain, Portugal and Italy that growth is substantial. The foreign born stock as a share of total population in 2005 varied from a low of 1.8 per cent in Poland to a high of 23 per cent in Switzerland (Table 4). Many European countries now have more than 10 per cent of their population foreign born.

Table 4: Foreign Born Populations (250,000 +) in European Nations – Ranked by Share of Total Population

| Country | Foreign Born (000s) | Foreign Born Share |
|----------------|----------------------------|---------------------------|
| Switzerland | 1,660 | 22.9 |
| Latvia | 449 | 19.5 |
| Austria | 1,234 | 15.1 |
| Ireland | 585 | 14.1 |
| Sweden | 1,177 | 12.4 |
| Germany | 10,144 | 12.3 |
| France | 6,471 | 10.7 |
| Netherlands | 1,638 | 10.1 |
| United Kingdom | 5,408 | 9.1 |
| Greece | 974 | 8.8 |
| Spain | 4,790 | 8.5 |
| Norway | 334 | 7.4 |
| Portugal | 764 | 7.3 |
| Denmark | 388 | 7.2 |
| Belgium | 719 | 6.9 |
| Czech Republic | 453 | 4.4 |
| Italy | 2,519 | 4.3 |
| Hungry | 316 | 3.1 |
| Poland | 703 | 1.8 |

Source: OECD Database and UN Migration Database (2005)

With free entry across the EU countries there is considerable movement from regions of job deficits to job surplus and The Schengen Agreement virtually guarantees free movement within the EU since 1995. Thus, Ireland with a growing economy has received large numbers of new immigrants in the past 10 years. The EU is also committed to developing a common policy on immigration. The goals will include the efficient management of migration the pursuit of immigrant smugglers and common asylum policies (Salt, 2005). Already there is evidence of the increasing flows from Eastern European countries, two fronts, Germany Brisbane in Spain, but also into Ireland. The anecdotal descriptions of French waiters in London and computer programmers in Dublin are simply the indications of the movement of Europeans within the EU for economic opportunities outside their places of birth (New York Times, June 2, 2006).

North America has also had substantial in migration, but while the US is home to 35 million foreign born persons they make up only 12 per cent of the US population. Migrants from Mexico are the largest single group of all foreign born persons in the United States, they make up almost half of the foreign born. Still there are large numbers from all the Asian countries and especially China, Korea, Japan and the Philippines. Relatively high foreign born birth rates have generated a combined foreign born and first-generation population of more than 50 million persons, about a sixth of the US population. It is likely that the migration pressures on the United States and on Canada too will continue to rise during the next decade or two. The continuing differential rates of population growth in Central America and recurring political and economic crises, as well as potential natural disasters are likely to propel additional individuals and families from central and South America to migrate north. Over the longer run declining population growth and increasing economic growth in Mexico will diminish migration pressures. At the same time the continuing US demand for labour and the extensive family ties in place will sustain Mexico's rank as the primary sender for immigrants, both legal and illegal to United States. While the southern border is a major transit point for undocumented Central American residents, the long US Canadian border will continue to be a major transit point for undocumented Asian immigrants bound for the United States.

While most migrants crossing international boundaries are a combination of labour migrants and those seeking family reunification, there are large numbers of refugee and asylum moves as well. The United Nations Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) has defined refugees (still only those who cross an international boundary) as those who move for a well founded fear of being persecuted or where their safety and freedom are threatened by external aggression or generalized violence in their country of origin. A wider definition (Olsen, 1979, p.130) recognizes that refugees may be "forced to leave their homes because of a change in their environment which makes it impossible to continue life as they have known it". There are approximately 8.4

million global refugees currently (2005). This is a slight decrease from previous years and is in fact at its lowest level in some time. The largest number of refugees, nearly one third of the total worldwide, are in Africa (Table 5). Nearly 2 million refugees are in Europe. Afghanistan continues to be one of the single largest countries for the origin of refugees; under the UN mandate at the end of 2005, 1.9 million Afghan refugees were reported by 72 asylum countries.

Table 5: Refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons and other displaced persons

| Region | Number of persons (2005) |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| Sub-Saharan Africa | 4,929,946 |
| North Africa | 226,858 |
| Middle East | 5,427,952 |
| South and Central America | 2,513,016 |
| United States | 549,083 |
| Canada | 167,723 |
| Australia | 66,786 |

Note: The numbers in Sub-Saharan Africa include 1.3 million displaced persons in Somalia and the Sudan, in the Middle East, 1.2 million persons in Iraq and in South America 2.0 million persons in Columbia


Source: United Nations, 2005 Global Refugee Trends, United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Geneva.

Internal displacement of course does not generate international migrants but it does impact the national distributions of population. It comes about from two primary forces – political conflict, and environmental stress. Africa continues to be the continent, most affected by internal displacement. It is estimated that over 12 million people across some 20 countries were displaced internally at the end of 2005. Most of these were in the Sudan's Darfur region (Clark, 2006a). Asia is similarly, an area of both displacement from political conflict and from environmental change, and how much from environmental change is hard to estimate.

We can draw parallels between the world population growth the increase in international migration, and outcomes for our inter-connected world. Both foreign direct investment and remittance transfers have grown along side increasing inter-connection (out-sourcing in place of worker flows), more migration and the connected transfer of funds to countries of origin (Figure

4).³ These parallel changes reflect a world of increasing connection and one in which international migration is playing an important role, certainly for remittance transfers. We can argue that foreign direct investment and remittance transfers are two sides of the same process. The investment transfers take advantage of business opportunities and the lower wages of foreign based workers; the remittances are the flows from workers who have been able to move, back to their families who have not been able to migrate. We might also suggest that the increase in foreign direct investment may be in turn stimulating the amount of international migration. Certainly it is increasing the linkages between developing and developed countries. The number of persons living outside a country of birth was about 60 million in 1950 and grew steadily to 100,000,000 by 1980, and since that time has nearly doubled to 180-190 million. Foreign direct investment, which was about 240 billion in 1970, doubled by 1980 and tripled in the next ten years to 1990. That process of increase has continued to the present time. World remittances totaled only 22 billion in 1960, the first date for which we have reliable information and by 2005 were more than 230 billion. Remittances to Mexico from the United States increased from about a billion in 1980 to 16 billion in 2004 reflecting the worldwide increase in migrants and their increased income

Figure 4: Growth in global foreign direct investment and remittances



Data Sources: For Foreign direct investment, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (www.UNCTAD.org) and for remittances, Congressional Budget Office of the United States, 2005; Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, 2004, *Workers' remittances to Mexico*; *The World Bank International Migration and Remittances*, April 2006.

³ It is useful to compare figures 1 and 4 as they suggest similar trajectories.

transfers home.

BORDERS AND BOUNDARIES – MANAGING MIGRATION

There is an ongoing debate about the role of borders and boundaries in controlling and managing international immigration. On the one hand Custred (2003) argues that borders matter, both in an instrumental and a symbolic sense, for the assertion of power and legitimacy and as the way citizens imagine their nations as sovereign communities (p.9). On the other hand, some think that borders will eventually melt away in the face of a new market forces, resulting in what Ohmae envisions as a borderless world (Ohmae, 1999). Indeed in the European Union in its latest form, internal borders have been significantly reduced, and there are relatively free movements of migrants between countries in the EU. Some even go so far as to argue that any border enforcement policy is based on misconceptions, and that international migration is a natural outgrowth of market expansion and economic integration (Massey, 2005). In this conceptualization international migration should be managed so that there should be choices for both partner nations. Migrants should move freely in response to opportunities because he argues they will eventually move back to Mexico. However, such an approach may not fully recognize the externalities which can arise with relatively free or totally free movement. Who pays for education, health care, and community services in an open border world, and what of crime and extradition, currently a touchy subject between Mexico and the United States? Criminals do flee to Mexico and are difficult to bring before US courts (MacDonald, 2004).


The debates about borders and national control have become more intense as the United States has attempted to control its borders, to prevent terrorist activity. Now even the border between United States and Canada has taken on a greater significance. Once described as the longest undefended border in the world, it is increasingly of concern to policy makers who worry about movements across that border. But it is the Mexican border which is at the heart of most of the discussion and engenders the most strongly held opinions. Not only is it a border between two nation states, it marks a boundary between two culture areas, and a divide between the prosperity of the developed world and the poverty of the communities along the border. The border also divides countries that have different concepts and approaches to law and extradition. Mexico serves as a safe haven for many former migrants who move back across the border when they have committed crimes (MacDonald, 2004). But these are sensitive issues and often the academic community is unwilling to raise the problematic issues which arise from drug trafficking, crime, and human smuggling which occur across the US border with Mexico. Once that border was relatively porous, now, rightly or wrongly, it is increasingly difficult to move easily from Mexico to the United States. However, the continuing rise in the undocumented population is testimony that walls do not

keep determined migrants from entering the United States nor does the Mediterranean boundary keep migrants from leaving North Africa for Europe.

RISE OF THE UNDOCUMENTED

The rise in the undocumented population arriving in the United States and Europe in the last decade or decade and a half is now a subject of both political and public debate. There are about 35 million foreign-born residents in the United States and more than 11.5 million of them are without documentation (Figure 5). The fact that about seven and a half million of the 11.5 million or more unauthorized migrants arrived in the last 10 years is what makes this change so different from the flows of immigrants in the past 30 years. In Europe the numbers are less sure but there may have been more than 3 million illegal immigrants in the European Union by the late 1990s and the number will certainly have increased (United Nations, World Economic and Social Survey, 2004). The increase in unauthorized immigration has led to calls for both amnesty programs, and in the US for greater enforcement of the US Mexican border. With the significant increase in the number of undocumented immigrants in the United States, and in Southern California in particular, there is also an increasing concern on both the outcomes for immigrants and the impacts on local communities.


Figure 5: The composition of the foreign born population in the United States



Source: Passel, J. 2006. The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migration population in the United States. Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C. The Pew Hispanic Center. Research Report.

Nationally, the best estimates of the on documented population in the United States suggest that it is about 11 to 12 million people. These estimates, based on the Current Population Series (CPS), also show that as much as two thirds of the unauthorized population has been in the country for 10 years or less (Passel, 2006). The undocumented population is slightly more male, than female, and about 16 per cent of the undocumented population is children. Although it is difficult to be precise, the current estimates are that the unauthorized population is growing at about 500,000-700,000 persons per year. Certainly that number is consistent with an increase in the undocumented population of about 10 million in the last fifteen years. Beginning in 1989, not long after the last amnesty in 1986, there has been a steady growth in the undocumented population (Figure 6).

Figure 6: The increase in the undocumented immigrant population in the United States. The bands suggest the uncertainty attached to the estimates.



Source: Passel, J. 2006. The size and characteristics of the unauthorized migration population in the United States. Estimates based on the March 2005 Current Population Survey. Washington, D.C. The Pew Hispanic Center. Research Report.

Undocumented migration is not only an issue in the United States, there are increasing issues related to undocumented populations in the EU as well. A recent news report began with the headline – “Half a million would-be immigrants awaiting to make the journey to Spain’s Canary Islands. Then on to the rest of Europe” (Expatica, 2006). Europe is a magnet for undocumented immigrants from Africa and Eastern Europe just as the United States

is for migrants from Mexico and Central America. Unlike the relatively accepted statistics on undocumented immigrants in the United States the data from Europe is less complete. The estimates from the Office of International Migration suggest that there are 8 million undocumented immigrants in Europe. Salt and Almeida (2006) rightly raise questions the reliability of the numbers of migrants generally and clearly they must be treated with caution. Still, Boswell and Shraubhaar (2004) suggest that estimates of around 500,000 migrants who enter EU countries illegally every year are reasonable. Commonly, illegal immigrants enter Europe legally but then over stay their visas.


As the EU has restructured the borders are now not the individual countries making up the EU but the borders at the edge, in southern Spain and eastern Poland. It is these borders which are subject to the pressure of new flows of undocumented immigrants from eastern European countries (Alscher, 2005). Poland has become a transit corridor for border flows. Between 1996 and 2003 more than 35,000 undocumented immigrants were apprehended on the eastern border of Poland. It is true that these numbers are far lower than the apprehensions on the US border with Mexico but they are an indicator of the changing flow and their pressures.

The number of illegal workers is put at around 500,000 in Germany, 300,000 in France and up to 800,000 in Italy. There may be as many as 570,000 in the United Kingdom. Of course, as in the United States, the numbers and the estimates are problematic and we need to reiterate that there is considerable room for error in the size of the estimates (Boswell and Straubhaar, 2004). However, there is little doubt that the number of illegal entries will continue to climb, lured by jobs and the linkages to family members already in Europe. As in the United States the illegal employment problem is the outcome of two related processes – restrictive legislation on legal labour migration and employers who want to minimize costs by employing cheap labour. Since the 1970s restrictions on labour migration, and fewer native born workers who will work in agriculture, cleaning and catering, there has been an increase in the number of undocumented workers in these industries. Again as in the United States it is the undocumented population which is willing to work for lower wages often in substandard working conditions. They take these marginalized jobs as a step on what they hope will be the ladder out of poverty, or to escape even more difficult political and economic situations in their countries of origin.

It is estimated that nearly 7.2 million unauthorized migrants were employed in the US in March 2005, almost 5 per cent of the civilian labour-force. Of course, they were a much greater percentage of particular occupational categories such as household services, retail services and construction as is illustrated with data for Southern California (Figure 7). That most of the immigrant population works in unskilled occupations is consistent with our

knowledge of immigrants who arrive with little formal education. They are in just those jobs that in a globalized economy are now rarely unionized, nor well-paying, and no longer provide a step in on the ladder of upward mobility.

Figure 7: Major employment activities of undocumented immigrants in Southern California.



Source: Flaming, Haydamack and Joassart (2005)

While we can be run relatively sure about the numbers, the ages and educational characteristics are much more difficult to ascertain. To answer these questions, I use a relatively unusual data set on families and neighbourhoods in Los Angeles we turned to some about survey results from the Los Angeles family and neighbourhood survey (Clark, 2006). As expected, undocumented immigrants in Southern California are largely Hispanic (99 per cent), they are by and large young (72 per cent under 35 years of age) and have little education (only 22 per cent have a high school education or better). The contrasts with the documented population provide a useful understanding of the age and educational differences. Nearly two-thirds of the undocumented population is under 35 years of age and nearly two thirds have less than a high school education. The documented population is nearly the reverse of that. Nearly 70 per cent of the documented population is over age 35 and nearly half have a high school education or more.

Given that such large a numbers of immigrants have low skilled jobs live in very poor neighbourhoods, and are subject to the unremitting problem of gaining a foothold in a new society, why do they come and why do they take low paying often informal sector jobs? The lure as in the past is the possibility of a better life and steady employment even if they come as family migrants. Moving from a rural sector uncertain employment context in Mexico, to Los Angeles increases the probability of being employed, and indeed if we use the data on remittances suggests that it is a successful strategy. It is clear that workers in California are able to find sufficient work to send back what amounts to 10 per cent of the Mexican economy (I noted earlier the remittances to Mexico total 16 billion dollars). It is relatively easy to understand the attraction of communities across the border, especially when there are family ties to smooth the way, and it is equally easy to provide an answer to why they work in the informal economy. For many workers without documented status they accept jobs in the informal sector as a survival strategy. Undocumented workers have lower employment rates and are also likely to have part-time employment which in turn emphasizes their likelihood of being in marginal employment and hints at the likelihood of ending up in the informal sector.

The question which naturally emerges from the previous analysis is whether the US and perhaps to a lesser extent some European nations with two tier labour systems which arise out of undocumented flows are developing “quasi-slave” societies. Certainly the jobs that undocumented immigrants do in Europe are not very different from those they do in the United States. They work as nannies, in household care and in low level service jobs in restaurants and cleaning services. These populations are clearly paid much less than others in the labour market. Their vulnerable situation gives rise to a two-tier labour market in which the beneficiaries are individuals who gain inexpensive services, businesses, which are able to benefit from lower labour costs and the population in general from lower-cost food, vegetables and clothing.

TRANSFORMING LOCALITIES

Migrants choose locations and in doing so they transform the local economies, the local communities and by extension political processes.⁴ Whether we engage in dialogues about diversity or lament the changing structure of our societies there is little doubt that international migration has set in process a sea change in the ethnic composition of the developed societies. While some celebrate the new diversity, others like Anthony Browne (2002) lament that “Britain is losing Britain”, and Hanson (2003) writes about “France’s

⁴ In 2005 an Hispanic Mayor, Antonio Villareagosa was elected in the City of Los Angeles.

immigrant problem and ours". Who is right, is there a right, in this debate about changing demographic composition? Certainly there are now contentious debates not just about the levels of immigration but about the changes that occurring in communities across the large metropolises of the developed world. But first we can record the level and nature of the community changes that have occurred in the past decade and a half especially in the United States.

TRANSFORMING LOCAL LABOUR MARKETS

In the United States, migrants now (2000 Census data) make up about 16 percent of the labour force, well above their proportion of the population as a whole (Clark, 2003). It is a nearly 200 percent increase in the proportion of the foreign born in the labour force in the past two decades. In the big immigrant states California, New York, Texas, Illinois and Florida, and their labour markets, the foreign born make up the majority of the workers in some industries and occupations. In the construction industry Spanish is the language of the construction site, and the heavy manual labour is increasingly the province of young Mexican and Central American workers. They are also increasingly the tile and brick layers, masons and stone workers. In the personal service industry, nannies and other household help are likely to be Central American while in the nail industry the workers are most likely to be women from Vietnam and Thailand. But it is important to realize that in the United States the foreign born workforce is a presence in all occupations, they are not just in services, construction and agriculture (Table 6). The pattern is somewhat different in Europe where there are greater controls on workplace participation. The data for the United Kingdom show that many legal immigrants are in the professions. Still, local labour markets in London, Amsterdam, Berlin and Paris do have large numbers of foreign born workers. Construction sites in Germany, The Netherlands, France and Italy employ Eastern Europeans, Poles, Ukrainians and Czechs who have moved in search of jobs and opportunities.

In the US the increase is not just in the service and construction industries. There have been rapid increases in the number of foreign-born teachers, doctors, lawyers and health professionals, especially the latter. Foreign-born persons hold more than 14 percent of all jobs in the medical profession, and in the engineering and science professions. On a visit to a hospital or doctor in Southern California there is nearly a 1 in 5 chance of being seen by a foreign-born nurse or doctor (Clark, 2003). Entry into professional occupations still requires significant levels of education and skills and so immigrants who come with English language skills and previous training are likely to do much better and to make faster progress up the economic ladder.

Table 6: Percent Distribution of the Foreign born by occupation in the United States and the United Kingdom

| Occupation | United States | United Kingdom |
|--------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| Managerial/professional | 23.4 | 56.4 |
| Technical/Sales/Admin. Support | 20.6 | 32.4 |
| Service | 21.1 | 5.8 |
| Precision Production | 12.7 | 5.3 |
| Operators/Labourers | 18.3 | - |
| Farming/Forestry | 3.8 | - |

Note: Foreign Labour in the United Kingdom: current patterns and trends. The data for the United Kingdom are based on work permits and are not strictly comparable to the survey data from the United States but they clearly show the difference in immigration policies.


Source: Current Population Survey, March Supplement, 2002, and J. Salt and Jane Millar (2006)

Thus, the local labour market at its most visible, in the services contacts that we make at the grocery store, the hardware store and even government agencies often shows two faces. On one hand, the face of the local labour market is the skilled well-educated worker who may be from India or from the Middle East or China who has little difficulty in communicating in the local labour market. On the other hand the local labour market is the shop assistant who has limited education and often limited English language skills. The outcomes can be outcomes of tension and cultural clash, we will return to this issue in the conclusion.

The local labour market in some cities in the US is also increasingly an informal labour market where new immigrants are hired on a temporary basis. This does not appear to be so prevalent in European nations where the controls on employment are more strict than in the United States and will become more so in the United Kingdom if the identity card is put in place. In Los Angeles, there is a growing divergence between the number of employees reported by employers and the number reported in the Current Population Survey (Figure 8). Beginning about 1990 and widening since then, reports from employers are significantly lower than the reports from the Current Population Survey. The gap hints at a growing under-reporting of employed persons and in turn suggests a growing and now sizeable unregulated labour market. The lower wages and often poorer working conditions are the out-

come of an informal labour market and in turn impact the ability of workers to make progress.

Figure 8: Comparing worker and employer reports of jobs.



Note: CPS is data from the Current Population Survey and ES-202 is the data from payroll tax data collected by the California Employment Department.

Source: Flaming, Haydamack and Joassart (2005).

TRANSFORMING LOCAL COMMUNITIES – DIVERSITY AND CULTURAL CHANGE

Just as the labour markets change so too do the communities of individuals and families. Communities in the United States that were once the bastion of little league baseball are now centres of soccer and it is not just the new immigrants who play, but the native-born as well (Price, et al. 2005). It is a true community transformation that changes local mores and culture. The most

visible changes are in the ethnic restaurants and in the signs for ethnic food stores, beauty shops and check cashing services. As the cultural landscape changes so too does the political landscape as new immigrants provide new ideas about community organization and participation. Still, it is the ethnic diversity that has both positive and negative connotations.

Diversity has been celebrated in North America, especially in Canada, as the beginning of a new blended society. It is more apparent in California and the West than in the east but demographic changes are diffusing across the American landscape, and the European, New Zealand, Australian and Canadian landscapes too. Those changes have perhaps been more muted in Europe where concentration rather than diffusion seems to be the current pattern but that will change too. Still, the changes in large cities like London are now dramatic as whole sections of the city become Albanian, Somalian, or Ukrainian.

What is the current thinking about incorporation and assimilation? The years since 9/11 have witnessed a sea change in these notions and it seems that there may be a shift back to emphasizing incorporation and assimilation and a shift away from multi-culturalism. Multi-culturalism arose as a counter to normative concepts of assimilation and especially in countries with large numbers of new immigrants – countries like Australia, Canada and to a lesser extent Holland. Multi-culturalism arose as a counter to the perceived ethnocentrism of assimilation. With its emphasis on mutual respect of different cultures and groups, it shifted the dialog away from melting pot metaphors in which groups were submerged to a process of cultural celebration and preservation. In perhaps the most detailed recognition of a multi-cultural perspective Canada in its Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (2002) explicitly detailed the “two way street” approach to integration. While newcomers were expected to adapt to Canada, Canadian society and its institutions are expected to adapt to a diversifying population (Biles, et al, 2005). Recently, this notion has come under serious questioning with the flow of very large numbers of new immigrants. While some see multiculturalism as a way of encouraging integration policies others, as Schlesinger (1992) above have suggested that multiculturalism can be a tool for creating if not encouraging segregation and separation Duncan (2005). The recent debates over the “veil” in British society are just one more manifestation of the cultural re-examination of integration and assimilation.

There is a tension about the expected decline in the white majority, sometimes expressed as a fear of the coming changes of a multi-minority society (Maharidge, 1996), or at least dismay about the declining “Americanness” of the United States (Schlesinger, 1992). Indeed, Schlesinger fears the disuniting of American society and worries that a multi ethnic or multi-cultural society could go the way of other ethnically divided nations with at the very least growing tensions and animosities amongst ethnic groups. In contrast the


more optimistic argue that the coming changes will celebrate the great diversity that is America and that different groups will enhance the dynamism of society as the new groups “assimilate” if not to, at least with the American population (Plotke, 1992). The debates over how this will take place are contested – what sort of incorporation of new groups will occur? Because for many, assimilation is no longer easily accepted as a description of the future of American society there is concern about the future of the “American Society. Might the US follow the path of other bifurcating nations like Russia and Yugoslavia?

What is the extent of community transformation? What do communities at least in North America look like? They are mixes not just of the major ethnic groups, Asians, Hispanics, Whites and Blacks but also a myriad of different Asian, Hispanic White and Black ancestry and origins. California is no longer a white majority and many large metropolitan areas are pluralities (Figure 9). Many other cities have mixes of Asian, Hispanic and African American populations which are between 30 and 40 percent. Monolithic white metropolitan areas are a feature of the past. Canadian cities are also complex mixes of ethnic and racial groups. Nor is it only cities in North America – Amsterdam, London and large European cities are also increasingly mixes of different ethnicities.

Hispanic and Asian populations are spreading out from the traditional arrival point cities. Los Angeles and New York, the traditional Hispanic metropolitan areas had 30 percent of the Hispanic population in 1990 but that had declined to 23 percent in 2004 (Frey, 2006). Now the growth of ethnic groups is in the fast growing second tier metropolitan areas – Las Vegas, Atlanta, Orlando and Phoenix. In the last half decade from 2000 to 2005, ethnic minorities contributed most of the gains in central metropolitan counties. They are the demographic lifeblood, in the central cities of older Metropolitan areas, but they are also fuelling the growth of suburban communities. Perhaps the most telling comment about changing communities is that 18 of what Frey (2006) calls the melting pot metros have majority minority child populations. In fact, the US child population is much more racially diverse than the adult population, which presages the changes to come.

Cities like Washington D.C., which was once discussed from the perspective of black and white separation, are now mixtures of multiple groups from many different countries. In the 1990s, nearly a quarter of a million immigrants from 193 different countries, chose the DC metropolitan area (Price, et al. 2005). In many ways Washington is emblematic of the kinds of changes that taking place in Metropolitan areas outside of the Gateway entry points. Washington, unlike Miami or Los Angeles, where one or two immigrant groups dominate, has a much more eclectic mix of immigrants from Central America, South America, Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. The library in Montgomery county Maryland welcomes visitors in 11 languages

Figure 9: Ethnic mix across cities in the United States with more than 500,000 population and no majority group.



Data Source: American Community Survey, 2005

(Price et al 2005). In Washington, as in other Metropolitan areas new immigrants arrive in the suburbs, as well as in the central city. The flows of immigrants to Washington reflect the bifurcated flows to many Metropolitan areas. It includes an influx of educated immigrants, including scientists, as well as lower income newcomers who work in construction, cleaning and personal services.

There is no doubt that the increased international migration of the last two decades is fundamentally changing the composition of local communities. Where the post World War Two flows were mostly within developed countries, those flows are now from low income to high income and from countries with populations that are very different in their cultural and ethnic back-

grounds to the countries in which they arrive. There is much greater involvement of Asia, African and Latin American migrants in the migration flows to developed economies. There has been too, considerable conversation about the emergence of transnational migration and transnational communities, whether or not, we except the arguments about trans-nationalism there is no question that there is a greater Diaspora than in the past. It is the implications of these changed flows which are at the heart of much of the discussion of how communities will evolve and change in the future. Whether there will be an evolution to assimilated societies or a breakdown in cooperation and the emergence of conflict is unclear, but it is certainly a question that is increasingly at the center of discussions of immigration and will be the focus of some concluding comments in this chapter.

PULLING TOGETHER OR PULLING APART – MIGRATION APOCALYPSE OR NEW WORLD MIGRATION AS CRISIS AND THE FUTURE

From a minor role in demography, international migration has morphed into one of the most contentious issues in discussions of demographic change and inequality. During the 1990s, there emerged a growing concern with the global population explosion, increasing inequality and increased population movements between these unequal nation states. In *The Coming Anarchy*, Kaplan (1994) portrayed a world of increasing tension, violence and civil breakdown as an outcome of massive immigration across national borders. This was paralleled by Weiner's (1990) *The Global Migration Crisis* and Brimelow's (1996) *Alien Nation*. These books and articles like them suggested that unless America in particular, but obviously Europe too, took dramatic steps, the survival of the Anglo-American race was at stake. At its extreme, in the Brimelow version, the United States is a fragile lifeboat that is pulling the economy of the entire world, but with open borders and the ethnic invasion of the multitude of coloured aliens the lifeboat is likely to sink. Pulling up the ladder, or to change the metaphor, *Closing Heavens Door* (Borjas, 1998) are necessary responses to the crisis of immigration and undocumented immigration in particular. To these writers our world is in crisis and immigration is at the heart of the crisis. The crisis requires a fundamental change in national policies, including the militarization of borders, vastly changed rules of entry, and new policies to deal with the immigrant undocumented population that is already here.

But are we in fact in crisis mode, and how likely are Europe and North America to receive continuing vast numbers of immigrants? An extensive and excellent review by Zolberg (2001) evaluates the pros and cons of a migration crisis. In the end he comes down on the position that although there is indeed increased international migration and that large numbers of people driven by economic circumstances to migrate have done so, it is not clear that

this process will continue, or that migration is “out of control”. Even though authors like Castles and Miller (2003) refer to our era as the age of migration, in fact, only about 2 per cent of the population in the world's countries is foreign born (Zlotnik, 1998). Zolberg (2001) even goes so far as to argue that 300,000 to 500,000 undocumented immigrants a year while worrisome, does not amount to a loss of control over our borders. The authors in the Zolberg volume, in general, come down on the view that there will be continuing migration and the issue is dealing with the flows humanely and effectively – to balance the needs of migrants who are willing to work hard with protections for native born workers and recognition of the costs to local communities of large scale immigrant flows. Ultimately, the solutions for a more effective and humane international migration need to focus as much on dealing with refugee generating behaviour in the developing world as policing the US borders. The issue should be more one of coming to accommodation, than of confrontation and contest.


While the optimists amongst us will opt for a view that new integrated and assimilated societies will emerge in a collaborative multicultural society, others see the possibility of considerable cultural conflict and that it may be difficult to reconcile increasing diversity with social adaptation and social cohesion. Only two decades ago OECD countries were largely homogeneous. The number of migrants to New Zealand, Australia and Britain and the European countries generally was relatively small. Often in the case of the British countries, those populations were of European ancestry and fitted relatively easy into the culture of their adopted country. Certainly their children married and became part of their new societies. As the flows increased and often the new immigrants concentrated in particular residential areas questions of their longtime integration were raised in their countries of new settlement. Perceptions that immigrants were unwilling to become parts of their new society fuelled tensions about their commitment to their new countries of adoption. The greater size of the flows exacerbates the tendency to remain separate, to seek out similar groups and to live separately, to attend mosques and not churches, to wear veils and to assert a right to cultural practices which may be illegal in their new country. That separatism has led to debates, about commitment, about whether or not the new immigrants will become a part of the new society. Perhaps they will remain un-assimilated (though there is a vigorous discussion about the relevance of assimilation as a concept for modern societies) and hue to their own cultural and social norms.

INSIDE OUTSIDE THE NATION STATE – ARE WE LOSING BRITAIN / AMERICA?

As the number all the immigrant has increased. So has the concern about their role in the wider political society. At its extreme, it takes on the concern expressed by Browne (2002) and Hanson (2003) where Britain is losing Brit-

ain or America is losing America. These who worry point out that this immigration is different from flows a hundred years ago. Then the flows occurred over a set period of time and died away. Now with the sustained migration pressures from developing countries, the huge disparities in wealth between developing and developed economies and the widespread knowledge in the developing world of the opportunities in Europe and more broadly, the OECD, has led to a process that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future. The differences between much of Africa and south India in levels of poverty, education, women's rights and other measures of development, and those same levels in the OECD are clearly a factor in generating an impetus to movement if not actual flows (Figure 10). Over the long run it would be short sighted not to expect at least some population movements from these countries to Europe and North America. The demographic stress in Africa in particular is likely to have long term impacts on migrant flows, in Africa as well as from Africa to North America and Europe.

Figure 10: The distribution of demographic stress 2000-2010



Source: Richard Cincotta, Robert Engelman and Daniele Anastasion 2003. *The Security Demographic: Population and Civil Conflict after the Cold War*. Washington, D.C. Population Action International, p. 71.

The potential for continuing flows raise the issues of participation in the nation state. The traditional concept, of citizenship is changing if it has not already changed completely. In the past the norm was to be a citizen of one state. Perhaps on migration that citizenship was transformed. Now dual citi-

zenship is common. In the past, the expectation was that legal immigrants would apply for citizenship and commit themselves to their new country. Now more than half the world's nations recognize dual citizenships. Does this matter? At least some worry that more liberal citizenship potentially divides the loyalties and changes the nature of political commitment.

There appears to be a major gap between the views of the elites and the views of the population as a whole. Polls in the United States and in Britain regularly show that the public is concerned and would like changes in the number and flows of immigrants. These populations do not necessarily want to stop immigration. But they do feel that the process and rate of change may be beyond the ability of all the society to integrate. On the other hand the political structure, perhaps influenced by lobbyists for businesses wanting low cost labour, or immigrants rights groups wanting greater access for disadvantaged groups, still favor maintaining or increasing immigrant flows. It is this difference which is currently being debated in Washington.

INEQUALITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

There are wiser and perhaps more thoughtful voices than those of Brimelow and his counterparts in Europe, Le Pen and Enoch Powell. Voices which suggest that the immigration flows will likely moderate and that the evidence for continuing flows is far from overwhelming. Moreover, it is not at all clear that immigration will overwhelm their new destinations and despite the debates about assimilation many immigrants inter-marry and blend into their new societies. Still the more strident messages have pointed out the reality of an aging relatively affluent white society and a growing ethnic and underprivileged society. It is a situation to which the world as a whole has paid only scant attention. The world still pays little attention to the continuing gulf between the one-fifth of the world's population which lives on less than \$2 a day and the rest. While aid may not be the solution it is hard to accept that the OECD spends \$300 billion in agricultural subsidies while restricting imports from developing countries.

Global migration has highlighted, what has always been pushed under the rug – global inequality. Now in the 21st-century it may be global migration that will force us to finally examine and deal with the continuing inequities in demographic structures and social outcomes. But, just how we will deal with the immigration problem is far from clear – but we can say that a pause in the flows, a process of documentation (identity cards) may be the price for a more coherent policy of citizenship and incorporation. It will be Britain still and it will be America still, but not the ones we know.

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